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I take a new look at the long-run implications of taxation through
the lens of modern Schumpeterian growth theory. I focus on the latest
vintage of models that sterilize the scale eﬀect through a process of
product proliferation that fragments the aggregate market into sub-
markets whose size does not increase with the size of the workforce.
This mechanism has interesting implications for the role of distor-
tionary taxation in general, and for revenue-neutral changes of ﬁscal
policy in particular. I show that the following interventions raise wel-
fare: (a) Granting full expensibility of R&D to incorporated ﬁrms; (b)
Eliminating the corporate income tax and/or the capital gains tax; (c)
Reducing taxes on labor and/or consumption. What makes these re-
sults remarkable is that in all three cases the endogenous increase in
the tax on dividends necessary to balance the budget has a positive ef-
fect on growth. The reason is that the dividend income tax reallocates
resources from product proliferation to quality growth.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The Job Growth and Taxpayer Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA)
reduced substantially the tax rates on individual dividend income and on
capital gains from sales of corporate shares. Supporters of this legislation
argue that it will reduce the corporate cost of capital and thus raise invest-
ment, growth and employment. Critics tend to focus on the Act’s distri-
butional implications and on the large budget deﬁcits that it will generate.
Regardless of the side that one takes in this debate, the JCTRRA has re-
vived economists’ interest in the macroeconomic implications of changes in
taxation of the earnings from corporate activity. Much of the current work
investigates the possible short-run stimulus to aggregate demand and the
long-run implications for saving and growth within the framework of the
neoclassical model of capital accumulation.
In this paper, I take a new look at the long-run implications of ﬁscal pol-
icy through the lens of modern Schumpeterian growth theory. I argue that
the novel elements introduced by the theory — imperfect competition, accu-
mulation of intangibles, economies of scale, the distinction between growth
of existing product lines and creation of new product lines — shed new light
on the workings of taxation, in particular of taxes that apply to corporate
activity. An intriguing result of my analysis, for example, is that higher
taxes on dividends raise growth and welfare.
I focus on the latest vintage of Schumpeterian models that sterilize the
scale eﬀect of the size of the aggregate market on ﬁrms’ incentives to do
R&D through a process of product proliferation that fragments the aggregate
market into submarkets whose size does not increase with the size of the
workforce. The consequence of this process is that fundamentals and policy
variables that work through the size of the aggregate market do not aﬀect
steady-state growth; they only have transitory eﬀects that, nevertheless, are
important determinants of welfare. In contrast, fundamentals and policy
variables that reallocate resources between productivity growth and product
proliferation do have long-run growth eﬀects.1
1As is well known, ﬁrst-generation endogenous growth models feature a positive relation
between aggregate market size and growth that results in a positive relation between the
scale of aggregate economic activity and the growth rate of income per capita. This is a
problem for the theory because there is no evidence that larger economies grow faster (see,
e.g., Backus, Keohe and Kehoe 1992, Jones 1995a,b, Dinopoulos and Thompson 1999).
Several contributions proposed solutions based on product proliferation: Peretto (1998,
1999), Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998), Young (1998), and Howitt (1999). See Jones
(1999), Aghion and Howitt (1998, 2004), Peretto and Smulders (2002), and Laincz and
Peretto (2004) for reviews of the various approaches and of the empirical evidence. Zeng
2The sterilization of the scale eﬀect through this mechanism allows one to
introduce population growth and elastic labor supply without getting coun-
terfactually large changes in the economy’s growth rate.2 The property also
assigns a novel and important role to taxes that apply to corporate proﬁts
(e.g., taxes on corporate income and on distributed dividends). The rea-
son is that these taxes create a wedge between the return to investing in the
growth of existing product lines — in the model, the improvement of the qual-
ity of products supplied by existing ﬁr m s—a n dt h er e t u r nt oi n v e s t i n gi nt h e
expansion of product variety — in the model, development of new products
brought to market by new ﬁr m s .( N o t i c et h a tt h eﬁrms that operate in this
economy are long-lived proﬁt centers that bring to market sequences of inno-
vations.) These features make this version of Schumpeterian growth theory
particularly useful for studying the implications of taxation, in particular
taxation of corporate activity. The model that I use is very tractable and
allows me to study analytically transition dynamics and welfare in response
to changes in tax rates.
My main results concern equilibrium dynamics under the assumption
that the government has no access to lump-sum taxes or public debt, holds
constant the fraction of GDP allocated to (unproductive) public expendi-
tures, and balances the budget at all times by endogenously setting the tax
rate on the dividend income earned by households. I show that:
• Granting full expensibility of R&D to incorporated ﬁrms (equivalently,
subsidizing R&D at the same rate as the corporate income tax) is
welfare improving.
• Eliminating the corporate income tax and/or the capital gains tax is
welfare improving.
• Reducing taxes on labor and/or consumption is welfare improving.
Recall that in all three cases the government makes up the revenue shortfall
by raising the tax rate on dividend income. This is what makes these results
remarkable. In all cases welfare rises unambiguously because the endoge-
nous increase in the tax on dividends necessary to balance the budget has a
positive eﬀect on growth. The reason is that the dividend income tax real-
locates resources from product proliferation to quality growth. One way to
and Zhang (2002) and Peretto (2003) study the implications of the elimination of the scale
eﬀect for tax policy but consider steady states only and ignore welfare.
2Turnovsky (2000) introduces elastic labor supply but must assume zero population
growth because his model exhibits the scale eﬀect.
3think about this is that the tax gives incentives to retain earnings and invest
them in existing ﬁrms as opposed to distribute them to stockholders (the
household) who can then reallocate them to entrepreneurs for the creation
of new ﬁrms.
The analysis assigns the above policies to two classes: (a) policies that
do not change the required revenue ﬂow that taxation of the ﬁrms’ earn-
ings must deliver but change the relative importance of speciﬁct a x e si n
generating that revenue (i.e., taxes on corporate income, on personal div-
idend income and on capital gains); (b) policies that change the revenue
ﬂow that these taxes have to generate. Granting full expensibility of corpo-
rate R&D and/or eliminating taxes on corporate income and capital gains
eliminate the distortions of the ﬁrms’ investment decisions. Financing these
changes with the tax on dividends implies that the policy does not require
adjustments in, e.g., taxes on labor income. In other words, polices of class
(a) concern only taxation of corporate earnings and, in practice, amount
to resetting the relative importance of each tax. The analysis shows that
repealing taxation of corporate earnings and capital gains, replacing it with
taxation of distributed dividends, raises welfare. (Eliminating the corpo-
rate income tax eliminates the distortionary eﬀect of partial expensibility of
R&D so that, in practice, the ﬁrst policy becomes redundant.) The intu-
ition is that taxes that have adverse growth eﬀects because they distort the
production/investment decisions of ﬁrms are replaced by a tax that has the
positive growth eﬀect discussed above.
Policies of class (b) change the required ﬂow of revenue that taxation
of dividends must generate and thereby increase the resulting distortion in
favor of quality growth. It is somewhat surprising to learn that reducing
taxes on labor income and increasing taxes on dividends raises welfare. The
intuition, however, is straightforward. Reducing taxes that aﬀect households
(i.e., taxes on labor income and consumption) reduces distortions of labor
supply, consumption and saving. This increases welfare through level eﬀects,
that is, changes in steady-state consumption and leisure. As stated above,
using the dividend tax to make up the revenue shortfall has a further positive
growth eﬀect. Thus, these policies raise welfare because of favorable level
and growth eﬀects.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Sec-
tion 3 characterizes equilibrium dynamics. Section 4 studies revenue-neutral
changes in taxation and establishes the main results. Section 5 concludes.
The Appendix discusses in some detail the robustness of the results by
sketching several modiﬁcations of the basic model that yield the same qual-
itative results as the version discussed in the main body of the paper.
42 The model
The economy is closed. To keep things as simple as possible, and to isolate
the role of dividend taxation, I abstract from physical capital and pub-
lic debt. In particular, I construct a model where the household’s portfo-
lio contains only securities (shares) issued by ﬁrms. These are backed up
by intangible productive assets accumulated through R&D. Thus, in this
environment the dividend income earned by households stems from verti-
cal (quality) and horizontal (variety) product diﬀerentiation.3 Introducing
physical capital in this structure is feasible (see, e.g., Aghion and Howitt
1998) but complicates the analysis without changing the basic results.
2.1 Final producers
A competitive representative ﬁrm produces a ﬁnal good Y that can be con-
sumed, used to produce intermediate goods, invested in R&D that rises the
quality of existing intermediate goods, or invested in the creation of new
intermediate goods. The price of this ﬁnal good is the numeraire, PY ≡ 1.
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where N is the mass of non-durable intermediate goods. These goods are
vertically diﬀerentiated according to their quality. The productivity of Li
workers using Xi units of good i depends on good i’s quality, Zi and on





The ﬁnal producer sets the value marginal product of intermediate good
i equal to its price, Pi, and the value marginal product of labor equal to the
3It is useful to be precise here. There is no capital in the usual neoclassical sense of a
homogenous, durable, intermediate good accumulated through foregone consumption. In-
stead, there are diﬀerentiated, non-durable, intermediate goods produced through foregone
consumption. One can think of these goods as capital, albeit with 100% instantaneous
depreciation. This structure allows me to draw a distinction between capital intended as
ﬁnancial assets issued by ﬁrms and backed up by their earnings and capital intended as an
intermediate good. As Judd (2003) points out, much of the intution behind the literature
on optimal taxation of capital stems from the property that capital income is construed
a st h ei n c o m et os u p p l i e r so ft h eh o m o g e n e o u s(durable) intermediate good. This paper’s
structure allows me to keep the two features of capital separated and focus on dividends
as the income paid to holders of ﬁnancial assets.




















The competitive ﬁnal producer pays total compensation θY and (1 − θ)Y
to intermediate producers and labor, respectively.
2.2 The corporate sector
The typical intermediate ﬁrm produces its diﬀerentiated good with a tech-
nology that requires one unit of ﬁnal output per unit of intermediate good
and a ﬁxed operating cost φZα
i Z1−α.5 The ﬁrm can invest units of ﬁnal
output to increase quality according to the technology
˙ Zi = Ri,
where Ri is the ﬁrm’s R&D investment. The ﬁrm’s pre-tax proﬁti s
Πi = Xi (Pi − 1) − φZα
i Z1−α − Ri, (4)
where Xi is output and Ri is R&D investment. The ﬁrm takes average
quality Z as given.
To highlight the role of taxation, let σ be the fraction of R&D expendi-
tures that the ﬁrm is allowed to subtract from the standard measure of cash




Xi (Pi − 1) − φZα
i Z1−α − σRi
¤
,
4The reader interested in the connection between this paper and the literature on
optimal taxation of capital (see, e.g., Judd 2003) might want to observe that neither
purchases nor sales of intermediate goods are taxed.
5Connolly and Peretto (2004) argue that ﬁxed operating costs play a crucial role in en-
dogenous growth theory because they draw a sharp distinction between variety-expansion
and quality-ladder models. Speciﬁcally, steady-state growth driven by product prolifera-
tion cannot occur if production of each good entails a ﬁxed cost. As a consequence, the
only dimension in which steady-state endogenous growth can occur is the vertical one
wherein progress along the quality ladder does not require the replication of ﬁxed costs.
The model discussed here builds on that insight.
6Notice that in the US tax code R&D is fully expensible. I assume partial expensibility
because it allows me to make some interesting points concerning tax policy.
6where tΠ is the corporate income tax rate. It follows that
Di =( 1− tΠ)Πi − (1 − σ)tΠRi
is the after-tax ﬂow of dividends distributed by the ﬁrm to its stockholders.7
This formulation makes clear that partial expensibility can be interpreted
as taxation at rate tΠ of fraction 1 − σ of the R&D undertaken by the
ﬁrm or, equivalently, as subsidization at rate σtΠ. This observation will be
important later on in the interpretation of the results.
Deﬁne the after-tax rate of return to equity for the individual stockholder
as
r =( 1− tD)
Di
Vi




where Vi is the price of ﬁrm i’s shares, tD is the tax on distributed dividends
and tV is the tax on capital gains. In equilibrium r must equal the rate of
return to saving obtained from the individual’s maximization problem (see
below) and thus is the same across ﬁrms. Integrating forward, this equation







1−tV 1 − tD
1 − tV
[(1 − tΠ)Πi(s) − (1 − σ)tΠRi]ds,
where ¯ r(t,s) ≡
R s
t r(v)dv is the average interest rate (return to saving)
between t and s.T h eﬁrm chooses the time path of its product’s price and
R&D in order to maximize this objective function subject to the demand
schedule (2) and the technology constraints discussed above.
The ﬁrm undertakes R&D up to the point where the shadow value of
the innovation, qi, is equal to its cost,
1 − tD
1 − tV
(1 − σtΠ)=qi ⇔ Ri > 0. (6)
Since the innovation is implemented in-house, its beneﬁts are determined by
the marginal after-tax proﬁt it generates. Thus, the return to the innovation















7This formulation corresponds to the view that investment is ﬁnanced internally and
dividends are a residual. Turnovsky (1995, Ch. 8 and 11) provides a detailed discussion of
alternative hypotheses concerning dividend behavior that give rise to results in line with
those derived here.
8The usual method of obtaining this condition is to write the Hamiltonian for the
optimal control problem of the ﬁrm. The derivation in the text highlights the intuition.
7To calculate the marginal proﬁt, observe that the ﬁrm’s problem is separable
in the price and investment decisions. With demand (2) and marginal cost
of production equal to one, the intermediate producer sets a price Pi = 1
θ.










i Z1−α − Ri.
Diﬀerentiating with respect to Zi, substituting the resulting expression into
(7), using (2) and imposing symmetry yields












Observe that the return to quality-improving R&D, which is internal to
the ﬁrm, does not depend on the tax on dividend income. The reason is
that the ﬁrm treats dividends as a residual and thus its internal produc-
tion/investment decisions are unaﬀected by taxation of the dividend income
received by the stockholder.
Entrepreneurs create new ﬁrms. The associated sunk cost of entry at
time t is βXi (t) in units of ﬁnal output. The focus here is on setup costs,
not on innovation costs.9 Setup costs are linear in the ﬁrm’s initial out-
put to capture in a simple way the idea that they depend on the productive
assets that need to be put in place to start operations (structures and equip-
ment). This assumption captures the fact that entry costs are sunk albeit
not necessarily independent of the initial choice of productive capacity.
Suppose that start-up ﬁrms ﬁnance entry by issuing equity. Entry is
positive if the value of the ﬁrm is equal to its after-tax start-up cost,
Vi = βXi ⇔ ˙ N>0. (9)
The proﬁt that accrues to an entrant is given by the expression derived for
incumbents. Hence, the value of the ﬁrm satisﬁes the arbitrage condition
(5). Taking logs and time derivatives of (9) and imposing symmetry yields












9If one wishes, one can think that ideas for new products are just a by-product of
production operations — in other words, all new ﬁrms are spin-oﬀso fe x i s t i n go n e s—
so that the only constraint on the growth of product variety is the cost of setting up
new production facilities. Alternatively one can think of the setup cost as including the
innovation cost.
8Observe that this rate of return decreases with tD. An important feature of
this environment, therefore, is that taxation of dividends distorts incentives
in favor of investing in existing product lines (quality growth) as opposed to
creating new ones (product proliferation).10
2.3 Households
The economy is populated by a representative household whose (identical)
members supply labor services and purchase ﬁnancial assets (corporate eq-
uity) in competitive labor and asset markets. Each member is endowed with




e−(ρ−λ)(s−t) logu(s)ds, ρ > λ ≥ 0, γ > 0
where
logu =l o gCe−λt + γ log(1 − l).
(To simplify the notation, I suppress time arguments whenever confusion
does not arise.) ρ is the individual discount rate. Initial population is
normalized to one so that at time t population size is eλt,w h e r eλ is the
rate of population growth. Instantaneous utility is deﬁned over consumption
per capita Ce−λt and leisure 1−l,w h e r eC is aggregate consumption and l
is the fraction of time allocated to work. γ measures preference for leisure.
The household faces the ﬂow budget constraint
˙ sNV + s ˙ NV =
h
(1 − tD)D − tV ˙ V
i
sN +( 1− tL)Wleλt − (1 + tC)C,
where s i st h en u m b e ro fs h a r e so fe a c hﬁrm held by the household, N is
the number of ﬁrms, D is the ﬂow of dividends distributed by each ﬁrm,
˙ V is the appreciation of each ﬁrm’s equity and W is the wage rate.11 The
government taxes labor income at rate tL, dividends at rate tD, capital gains
at rate tV , and consumption at rate tC.
The optimal plan for this setup is well known. The household saves and
supplies labor according to:
ρ − λ +
˙ C
C
= r =( 1− tD)
D
V




10The derivation of the return to equity in (10) posits that entry costs are not expensible.
The Appendix shows that the paper’s basic results remain qualitatively unchanged if entry
costs are expensible.
11I impose symmetry across ﬁrms in the budget constraint to keep the notation simple.




The Euler equation (11) deﬁnes the after-tax, reservation rate of return to
saving that enters the evaluation of corporate equity discussed above.
2.4 Government
The government cannot borrow and thus satisﬁes the budget constraint
G = tLWL+ tCC + tΠ [ΠN +( 1− σ)RN]+tDDN + tV ˙ VN.
Production of one unit of public goods requires one unit of ﬁnal output.
This is equivalent to assuming that the government purchases ﬁnal goods.
It is useful to characterize ﬁscal policy as
G = gY, g < 1
where g can be either endogenous, given a vector of ﬁxed tax rates, or ﬁxed,
in which case one of the tax rates is endogenous.
3 Equilibrium dynamics with ﬁxed tax rates
This section speciﬁes ﬁscal policy as a vector of constant tax rates. It is
useful to break down the general equilibrium system in two components: A
block of equations characterizing labor and output market equilibrium that
determine employment, output and the economy’s saving ratio; a block char-
acterizing the assets market that determines the allocation of saving across
alternative investment opportunities on the quality/variety margin, and thus
determines the economy’s transition dynamics and long-run growth.
3.1 Employment, output and saving
Deﬁne the consumption ratio c ≡ C
Y , the proﬁtr a t i oπ ≡ ΠN
Y ,t h eg r o w t h
rate of quality z ≡ ˆ Z = R
Z, and the number of ﬁrms per capita n ≡ Ne−λt.
(A hat on top of a variable denotes a proportional growth rate.) The labor







10Recall that the labor market is competitive and clears instantaneously so
that l is the economy’s employment ratio. In symmetric equilibrium (1) and
(2) evaluated at price Pi = 1
θ allow me to write
Y = ΩleλtZ, (13)
where Ω ≡ θ
2θ
α(1−θ). This is the supply side of the output market. Equilib-
rium requires
Y = G + C + N(X + φZ + R)+βX ˙ N,
where G is given by the government’s budget constraint.
Now recall that substitution of the government’s budget constraint into
the economy’s resources constraint yields the household’s budget constraint.
Add Ns˙ V to both sides of the constraint, divide through by NsV,a n d
normalize the number of shares issued by each ﬁrm to 1. The equilibrium
relations for factor incomes, the relation NX = θ2Y ,a n dt h ef r e ee n t r y










(1 − tL)(1− θ) − (1 + tC)c
βθ2 .





βθ2c − (ρ − λ) − (1 − tL)
1 − θ
βθ2 . (14)
Since the tax rates tC and tL are constant, the consumption ratio jumps to
the constant value
c∗ =
(ρ − λ)βθ2 +( 1− tL)(1− θ)
1+tC
.












Thus, this economy exhibits the desirable property that at all points in time
the (endogenous) saving ratio, 1 − c∗,i sc o n s t a n t .
To understand why, observe that the assumption that the entry cost is
proportional to the ﬁrm’s initial output yields that the aggregate value of
the securities issued by ﬁrms is proportional to aggregate output. Given
11logarithmic utility, the rate of return to stocks demanded (and earned) by
savers implies that the household’s budget constraint reduces to an unsta-
ble diﬀerential equation relating the rate of growth of the consumption ratio
to its level. It follows that the unique equilibrium trajectory that satisﬁes
boundary conditions is for the consumption ratio to jump to its steady state
value. This property simpliﬁes greatly the analysis of transition dynamics.
The reason is that the economy’s saving ratio does not depend on the interest
rate since log-utility implies that the substitution and income eﬀects can-
cel out. This provides a convenient split between the consumption/saving
decision of households, which generate the overall amount of resources avail-
able for investment, and the production/investment/entry decisions of ﬁrms,
which determine the allocation of those resources across the two margins of
technological advance, quality and variety.12
The derivation above uses the equilibrium conditions for the labor, out-
put and assets markets, and the government’s budget constraint. Recall that
by assumption public spending does not aﬀect output or utility. Hence, the
government’s budget constraint simply determines the amount of resources
that the government subtracts from the system and can be ignored in the
rest of this section’s analysis. The next section brings the budget constraint
back to the forefront and studies revenue-neutral changes in tax structure.
3.2 The quality/variety trade-oﬀ in the assets market
A useful consequence of the property that the saving ratio is constant is that
the reduced-form, aggregate production function in (13) yields ˆ Y = z + λ,
while the fact that c is constant yields ˆ C = ˆ Y . These two relations and the
Euler equation (11) yield that the instantaneous reservation interest rate of
savers is
r = ρ + z. (15)
Given this rate, the interesting economic problem concerns the allocation of
resources across quality and variety growth.
The return to quality growth characterized in the previous section, as
well as the expression for pre-tax proﬁt, contains the ratio of output to
12One can relax the assumption of log utility and use preferences that feature (constant)
intertemporal elasticity of substitution diﬀerent from one, provided one preserve unitary
elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure. The Appendix shows the
dynamical system that obtains in this case and argues that the paper’s qualitative results
remain the same. The cost is that the analysis of transitional dynamics, and thus of
welfare, becomes more complicated.
12quality, X






This term plays a key role in capturing the role of scale in this model. To
show this, I proceed in steps.









where Ψ ≡ (1 − tV ) 1−tΠ
1−σtΠ. This expression shows that incentives to in-
vest in quality improvements of existing products depend positively on the
employment ratio, l, and negatively on the number of ﬁrms per capita, n.
The reason is that higher employment shifts out the conditional demand for
each intermediate good so that the output to quality ratio, X
Z ,r i s e s .T h i s
kicks in a cost-spreading eﬀect at the ﬁrm level whereby the cost of quality-
improving innovation is spread over more units of the good that the ﬁrm
sells so that the unit cost of innovation is lower. By the same token, the
return to quality-improving innovation decreases with the number of goods
per capita because of the market share eﬀect: the more goods there are,
the more total demand for intermediates is spread thin across goods, and
the weaker is the cost-spreading eﬀect just discussed. Finally, the term Ψ
captures the distortionary eﬀect of taxation of capital gains and proﬁts on
the ﬁrms’ internal production/investment decisions.
Next, I rewrite the expression for pre-tax proﬁt in (4) as




This expression highlights two important forces. First, the proﬁt ratio is
negatively related to quality growth because R&D is an endogenous ﬁxed,
sunk cost that the ﬁrm pays at any moment in time. Similarly, the fact that
ﬁxed overhead costs are linear in quality yields that the proﬁt ratio falls
with φ. Second, the proﬁt ratio is increasing in the employment ratio, l,a n d
decreasing in the number of ﬁrms per capita, n,r e ﬂecting the cost-spreading
and market-share eﬀects discussed above.
Finally, I rewrite the return to variety in (10) as
r =










+( 1− tV ) ˆ X.
13This expression shows the role of the basic forces just discussed in determin-
ing the return to variety growth (entry). The key is that ﬁrst term is the
after-tax dividend ratio, DN
Y , that one obtains after accounting for taxation
of corporate proﬁts, net of expensible R&D costs, and distributed dividends.
Using the fact that ˆ X = z − ˆ n and the reservation rate (15), I can rewrite
this relation as
[ρ +( 1− tV )ˆ n]βθ2 =( 1− tD)(1− tΠ)π − ˜ tzz, (19)
where
˜ tz ≡ tV βθ2 +( 1− tD)(1− σ)tΠ
n
Ωl
is the eﬀective tax rate on quality growth. The term on the left-hand-side of
(19) reﬂects the fact that product variety growth reduces the market share
of each ﬁrm and thus the stream of future dividends it pays.
Equation (19) deﬁnes the pre-tax proﬁt ratio needed to generate the
required after-tax rate of return to saving for the households. Equation (18)
characterizes how ﬁrms’ decisions generate the pre-tax proﬁtr a t i o .O b s e r v e
now that the employment ratio, l, is constant, take into account the non-





θ(1 − θ) Ωl∗
n − φ
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Equations (18)-(20) fully determine equilibrium of the assets market and
determine the allocation of the economy’s saving across quality and variety
growth.
3.3 The dynamical system
The equilibrium outlined above reduces to a very simple dynamical system.
Inserting (20) into (18) yields
π (n)=
½
θ(1 − θ)(1− Ψα) − n
Ωl∗ [φ(1 − Ψα) − ρ] n<¯ n
θ(1 − θ) −
φn
Ωl∗ n ≥ ¯ n
.
14Now observe that equation (19) can be rewritten
ˆ n = χ(n) ≡
(1 − tΠ)(1− tD)π(n) − ˜ tz (n)z (n) − ρβθ2
(1 − tV )βθ2 . (21)
Figure 1 illustrates the resulting dynamics.
A necessary condition for the system to feature a stable rest point in
the region n<¯ n is χ0 (n) < 0. Now observe that z0 (n) < 0s ot h a ta
necessary condition for χ0 (n) < 0i sπ0 (n) < 0. This in turn requires ∂π
∂z > 0
in equation (18), that is, φ(1 − Ψα) > ρ. If this condition fails, χ0 (n) > 0
in the region n<¯ n, so that for an initial condition n(t) < ¯ n the system
features an accelerating entry rate until the economy crosses the threshold
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ρβθ2





If φ(1 − Ψα) > ρ, in contrast, χ0 (n) < 0 is possible. Then, for an initial
condition n(t) < ¯ n, the entry rate eventually decelerates and the system
converges to the steady state n∗ < ¯ n,w h e r en∗ solves
(1 − tΠ)(1− tD)π(n)=ρβθ2 + ˜ tz (z (n))z (n).
Inspection of the ﬁgure suggests that this steady state exists and is stable if




ρ +( 1− tV ) 1−tΠ
1−σtΠαφ
(1 − tΠ)(1− tD)
.
Recall that the ratio 1−θ
θ =
P(X−1)
X is the ratio of the ﬁrm’s gross cash ﬂow
to output. Hence, this condition says that the equilibrium with positive
quality growth occurs if setup costs take up a suﬃciently large fraction of
the gross cash ﬂow. This guarantees that the market does not become too
crowded.
A simpler, and more insightful, characterization of dynamics in the re-
gion (0, ¯ n) proceeds as follows. First, use equations (15) and (17), and the
fact that in steady state ˆ n = 0, to rewrite equations (18) and (19) as:
π = θ(1 − θ)
ρ + z (1 − Ψα)
Ψαφ + ρ + z
; (22)
15π =
ρβθ2 + ˜ tz (z)z
(1 − tΠ)(1− tD)
, (23)
where
˜ tz ≡ tV βθ2 +( 1− tD)(1− σ)tΠ
θ(1 − θ)Ψα
ρ + z + Ψα
.
A c c o r d i n gt ot h eﬁr s te q u a t i o n ,t h eg r o w t hr a t eo fq u a l i t yh a st w oo p p o s i t e
eﬀects on the proﬁtr a t i o : t h eﬁrst is due to the fact just discussed that
R&D is an endogenous ﬁxed, sunk cost for the ﬁrm; the second is due to
the fact that growth is positively related to the return to innovation, which
is positively related to the output to quality ratio. Recall that this equation
characterizes how ﬁrms’ decisions generate the pre-tax proﬁtr a t i o ,w h i l e
the second equation characterizes the pre-tax proﬁt ratio needed to generate
the required after-tax rate of return to saving for equity holders. The joint
solution of these two equations yields the pair (z∗,π∗) that characterizes the
steady-state equilibrium of the assets market.
The upper panel of Figure 2 illustrates the determination of the steady
state in (z,π) space.13 (Observe that the necessary existence condition
φ(1 − Ψα) > ρ implies that the proﬁt locus (18) is increasing in z.) The
lower panel illustrates dynamics in (n,z) space. The economy is at all times
on equation (20), the downward sloping line in the ﬁgure. On the branch of
(20) that lies above the steady state locus, the economy experiences a rate
of entry that is less that the rate of population growth so that the number
of ﬁrms per capita shrinks. The reverse happens on the branch of (20) that
lies below the steady state locus. Notice, ﬁnally, that (20) yields
n∗ =
θ(1 − θ)ΨαΩl∗
z∗ + ρ + Ψαφ
. (24)
As expected, the steady state (n∗,z∗) is stable. To trace dynamics in re-
sponse to changes in tax policy one simply needs to check how the change
shifts the z∗ line deﬁned by the solution of (22)-(23) and the instantaneous
growth equation (20).
3.4 The eﬀects of tax rates
Taxation of wages reduces both the consumption and employment ratios
and has no eﬀect on growth. Taxation of consumption reduces the con-
sumption ratio and has no eﬀect on the employment ratio and on growth.
13Notice that there are two solutions. The one with the smaller values of z and π is
stable, the other one is unstable and can be ruled out; see the analysis of dynamics in
Figure 1.
16An important feature of the asset market equilibrium just characterized, in
other words, is that it pins down steady-state growth independently of the
scale factor Ωl and thus of tL and tC. It should be clear why: changes in
ﬁscal variables that aﬀect the employment ratio l∗ are fully absorbed by the
number of ﬁrms per capita, see equation (24), so that the growth rate of
quality remains unchanged. This result reﬂects the property that the model
does not exhibit the scale eﬀect because endogenous product variety steril-
izes the eﬀects of aggregate market size on the individual ﬁrm’s incentives
to innovate.
Taxation of dividends, capital gains and/or proﬁts has no eﬀect on the
consumption and employment ratios. Recall that the reason behind this
property is that these taxes govern the wedge between pre- and after-tax
r e t u r n st os a v i n gw h o s ee ﬀect on saving and labor supply is sterilized by
the assumption of log utility. In the Appendix I argue that relaxing this
assumption does not aﬀect the qualitative results of the paper while it makes
the analysis of dynamics and welfare harder. Assuming log-utility, on the
other hand, has the advantage that it allows me to concentrate on how these
taxes distort decisions on the quality/variety margin.
The tax on dividends has a positive eﬀect on growth. The reason is
that this tax does not aﬀect the ﬁrms’ internal R&D decisions and thus it
only aﬀects the wedge between pre- and after-tax returns to equity. As a
consequence, it only shifts up the equity locus (23) — capturing the fact that
the economy must generate a higher proﬁt ratio to deliver to stockholders the
required after-tax return on equity — and thus generates a movement along
the proﬁt locus (22) that produces faster growth and a higher proﬁtr a t i o .
An important thing to notice in this regard is that the steady state number
of ﬁrms per capita n∗ decreases with tD, see equation (24), so that, in line
with conventional wisdom, taxing the returns to savings (the households
equity holding) reduces the incentives to accumulation. The key is that
the bulk of the adjustment is borne by product variety, not by growth of
existing product lines. Thus, the dividend income tax reallocates resources
from product proliferation to quality growth driven by R&D internal to the
ﬁrm. One way to think about this is that the tax gives incentives to retain
earnings and invest them in existing ﬁrms as opposed to distribute them to
stockholders (the household) who can then reallocate them to entrepreneurs
for the creation of new ﬁrms.
The tax on proﬁts has an ambiguous eﬀect on growth and the number
of ﬁrms. This outcome depends on two forces. First, the distortion due to
partial expensibility of R&D, the term Ψ, shifts the proﬁt locus up. The re-
sulting movement along the equity locus produces slower growth and a lower
17proﬁt ratio. Opposite to this force is the wedge between the pre-tax and
the after-tax return to equity that shifts the equity locus up. The resulting
movement along the proﬁt locus produces faster growth and a higher proﬁt
ratio. Observe that the ﬁrst force depends crucially on the assumption that
R&D is partially expensible. If R&D is fully expensible (as in the US tax
code), then σ =1s ot h a tΨ =1− tV and the distortionary eﬀect of the
corporate income tax on ﬁrms’ internal R&D decisions disappears. In this
case, the corporate income tax has a positive eﬀect on growth, exactly like
the dividend income tax. In fact, with full expensibility of R&D taxation of
proﬁts and taxation of dividends are indistinguishable. The reason is that
all costs borne by the ﬁrm — variable and ﬁx e dp r o d u c t i o nc o s t sp l u sR & D
costs — are fully expensible so that taxing proﬁts before or after distribution
makes no diﬀerence. Another facet of this result is that expensibility of
incumbents’ R&D costs implies an implicit subsidy at rate tΠ that does not
apply to entrants. In other words, the corporate income tax discriminates
in favor of quality growth. One might think, therefore, that the eﬀects of
the corporate income tax depend crucially on the assumption that the R&D
expenditures of incumbents are expensible while the setup costs of entrants
are not. In the Appendix I argue that this is not the case. I show that if
the R&D expenditures of incumbents and the setup costs of entrants receive
symmetric ﬁscal treatment the results do not change. The reason is that as
long as expensibility is only partial (σ < 1), identical nominal treatment of
incumbents and entrants still gives rise to diﬀerent eﬀective subsidies implied
by the corporate income tax. This is because R&D decisions of incumbents
are driven by marginal proﬁts, whereas entry decisions are driven by full
proﬁts.
Finally, the tax on capital gains, tV , has the same qualitative eﬀects as
the corporate income tax just discussed, except that the distortion of ﬁrms’
internal R&D decisions does not depend on the expensibility parameter (σ)
and thus never vanishes.
3.5 Welfare
One of the desirable features of this model is the simple analysis of welfare
it aﬀords. I now turn to this feature. Let 0 be an arbitrary starting date.
Taking into account that the consumption and employment ratios jump to
their steady-state values, output per capita, y ≡ Ye −λt,a tt i m et>0i s
logy(t)=l o gΩl∗ +
Z t
0
z (s)ds +l o gZ (0).
18Without loss of generality I can normalize Z (0) ≡ 1. Using this expression,
Ic a nw r i t et h eﬂow of utility inside the welfare function as
logu(t)=l o g e−λtC (t)+γ log(1 − l(t))
=l o g Ωl∗ +l o gc∗ +
Z t
0
z (s)ds + γ log(1 − l∗).
As one can see, the number of ﬁrms per capita, n, does not have a direct
eﬀect on income per capita, y, the consumption ratio, c, or the employment
ratio, l. The reason why it matters is that given aggregate variables it
determines ﬁrm-level variables and thus drives the dynamics of the interest
rate and growth. The Appendix shows that relaxing this property and
allowing for positive social returns to variety does not change the basic
results of the paper, while it makes the analysis harder.
Flow utility features a tension between work and leisure. The following
result allows me to resolve this tension.
Lemma 1 Holding constant the consumption ratio c, ﬂow utility is increas-
ing in the employment ratio l.
Proof. See the Appendix.
With this result in hand, I can now analyze the eﬀects of taxes. I limit
the discussion to two examples. First, consider a reduction in the labor in-
come tax. According to the the discussion above, this change does not aﬀect
steady state quality growth. Thus, in Figure 2 the ﬂat steady-state growth
locus z∗ does not move. On the other hand, the tax cut induces people to
work more so that labor supply and employment rise. Moreover, because
it raises after-tax labor income, the tax cut raises the consumption ratio.
Now notice that the higher employment ratio shifts up the downward slop-
ing instantaneous growth locus. (Recall that the employment ratio jumps
instantaneously to its steady-state value.) As a result, the economy expe-
riences a transition charecterized by permanently higher employment and
consumption ratios and temporarily faster than trend quality and variety
growth. For the former, the baseline trend is the value z∗ that solves equa-
tions (22)-(23). For the latter, the baseline trend is the growth rate of
population λ. Now, according to Lemma 1 the rise in the employment and
consumption ratios raise welfare. On top of these level eﬀects, there is the
temporarily faster growth of quality which implies that at the end of the
transition the level of TFP is higher. This is important: this tax cut does
19not change the steady-state growth rate so that its welfare beneﬁts stem
from level eﬀects.
Contrast this with a reduction of the dividend income tax. The con-
sumption and employment ratios do not change so that there are no level
eﬀects. Moreover, the instantaneous growth locus does not shift because this
tax does not distort the internal decisions of ﬁrms. Hence, the only eﬀect of
this tax cut is to shift down the steady-state growth locus z∗. The resulting
transition is characterized by a gradual slowdown of quality growth and by
temporarily faster than trend variety gowth. Since in this setup there are
zero social returns to variety, the welfare eﬀect of this transition is negative.
(The Appendix discusses the implications of relaxing this assumption and
introducing positive social returns to variety.) One should not read to much
into this (perhaps) surprising result since the exercises undertaken in this
section eﬀectively ignore the government’s budget constraint. I thus post-
pone a more detailed discussion of the intutition behind this result to the
next section, where I take into account the government’s budget constraint.
Here it is suﬃcient to say that the quality/variety trade-oﬀ driving this
model delivers surprising results concerning taxes because diﬀerent agents
operate on its two sides: quality growth is driven by the internal R&D deci-
sions of existing ﬁrms; variety growth is driven by the entry decisions of new
ﬁrms.14 The next section explores this aspect of the story in more detail.
14As mentioned, in the Appendix I argue that the mechanism driving these results is
robust to several modiﬁcations of the basic model. One issue that I leave out, but that
warrants further discussion, is how the results change if one changes the long-run engine
of growth from one of “creative accumulation” to one of “creative destruction” whereby
quality-improving innovations are brought to market by newborn ﬁrms that replace current
i n c u m b e n t s .I ns u c ha ne n v i r o n m e n t ,t h e r ei sn oR & Dd e c i s i o ni n t e r n a lt ot h eﬁrm and
thus — one might think — the mechanism discussed in this paper might fail. I counter this
argument with three observations. First, most product-speciﬁc innovations (in particular
of the incremental type discussed here) are brought to market by existing, well-established
ﬁrms. Hence, the model that I set up here is empirically more relevant than the creative
destruction version. Second, although feasible, introducing creative destruction makes the
analysis much more cumbersome, while a main attraction of my model is its tractability.
Third, creative destruction does not remove the distinction between the vertical (quality)
and horizontal (variety) dimensions of technological advance and thus does not eliminate
the wedge between returns to vertical and horizontal R&D due to taxes on corporate
proﬁts and distributed dividends or to other government interventions (see, for example,
the models discussed in Aghion and Howitt 1998 and the analysis of the eﬀects of R&D
subsidies in Howitt 1999). In other words, there is no reason to expect that creative
destruction would undo the basic mechanism in general.
204 Revenue-neutral changes in ﬁscal policy
The previous section has characterized the eﬀect of a given tax structure
on the growth path of the economy. This section considers the case of
endogenous tax rates. To bring out the novel aspects of the model, I focus
on changes in ﬁscal policy that reduce taxation of wages, consumption, proﬁt
or capital gains making up the revenue shortfall with an increase in the tax
on dividends.
4.1 The government’s budget and the role of taxes on proﬁts,
dividends and capital gains
Let T ≡ g − tL (1 − θ) − tCc∗. The government’s budget constraint then
reads
T =[ tΠ + tD (1 − tΠ)]π + tΠ (1 − tD)(1− σ)
NR
Y
+ tV βθ2 ˆ X.
Observe that T deﬁnes the revenue ﬂow that taxation of proﬁts, dividends
and capital gains must generate. The right-hand side of this expression em-
phasizes two things. First, the eﬀective tax rate on proﬁts is tΠ+tD (1 − tΠ);
this is the well-known double taxation of dividends. Second, the last two
terms capture taxation of growth through two channels. The ﬁrst is obvious:
partial expensibility implies that fraction 1 − σ of the ﬁrm’s R&D is taxed
at rate tΠ. The reason why the government’s revenue generated by this tax
is multiplied by 1−tD is that earnings that the ﬁrm retains to ﬁnance R&D
do not get taxed as distributed dividends. The second channel is the tax
on capital gains, which in fact is a tax on the ﬁrm’s growth. The reason
is that the free-entry condition pins down the value of the ﬁrm’s shares as
proportional to the ﬁrm’s size which, in turn, is proportional to the quality
of its good.
To highlight these features, I use the notation introduced in the previous
section and rewrite the budget constraint as
T =[ tΠ + tD (1 − tΠ)]π (z)+˜ tz (z)z − tV βθ2ˆ n.
I now can use the expressions for π and ˆ n derived above, equations (18) and
(21), to rewrite the budget constraint as
T =









This notation allows me to highlight that tD, tV , tΠ are just diﬀerent ways
of taxing the same underlying income ﬂow, π,f r o mt h eﬁrms’ productive
21assets. However, because they introduce diﬀerent distortions their welfare
eﬀects diﬀer. Recall now that in this exercise T is constant so that this
expression determines the endogenous tax rate tD as a function of the proﬁt
ratio π. The right-hand side deﬁnes the dividend-tax revenue curve.
An interesting feature of this characterization of the government’s budget
constraint is that it identiﬁes two classes of policies: (a) policies that do not
change T, the required revenue ﬂow that taxation of the ﬁrms’ net cash
ﬂow must deliver, but change the relative importance of tD, tΠ and tV in
generating that revenue, and (b) policies that change T.
4.2 Experiments
Substitution of the government budget constraint into the expression for the
rate of return to entry, equation (19), yields
(ˆ n + ρ)βθ2 = π − T. (26)
This allows for a very simple characterization of dynamics. I focus on the
equilibrium path in the region (0, ¯ n)w h e r ez>0. First, observe that ˆ n =0
implies
π∗ = ρβθ2 + T. (27)
Recall that this is the equity locus, that is, the relation that determines
the proﬁt ratio that must obtain in equilibrium in order to deliver to asset-
holders the required after-tax rate of return. The intersection of this locus


















Thus, z∗ is the steady-state growth rate that delivers the required rate of
return to stockholders. Finally, n∗ is given by evaluating (20) at this value
z∗; see equation (24) above.
As one can see, the important change with respect to the case of ex-
ogenous tax rates is that in this exercise the steady-state proﬁtr a t i oπ∗ is
pinned down by exogenous factors and no longer depends on quality growth
z. The analysis of dynamics is similar. Consider Figure 3. The economy is
22at all times on equation (20), the downward sloping line. The steady state
(n∗,z∗), given by the intersection of (20) and (28), is stable.
Policies of class (a) deﬁned above, those that do not change T,s h i f tb o t h
the growth equation (20) and the z∗ line through the term Ψ. Policies of
class (b) that change T because they change tL, tC,s h i f tt h eg r o w t he q u a t i o n
(20) through the scale factor l and shift the z∗ line because they change the
proﬁt ratio that must arise in equilibrium to deliver to stockholders their
required after-tax rate of return. This feature highlights that policies of class
(a) operate directly by reducing distortions of the production/investment
choices of ﬁrms and indirectly by distorting decisions on the quality/variety
margin through the endogeneity of the tax on dividends. Policies of class
(b) operate directly through the size of the market and indirectly through
the endogeneity of the tax on dividends.
I summarize comparative statics results as follows.
Proposition 2 When the government balances the budget by setting en-
dogenously the tax rate on dividend income, steady-state quality growth, z∗,
is decreasing in the tax rates on labor, consumption, capital gains and proﬁts,
tL, tC, tV , tΠ, and is increasing in the expensibility parameter, σ. Steady-
state product variety, n∗, is increasing in the tax rate on consumption, tC,
and is decreasing in the expensibility parameter, σ.T h e e ﬀects of the tax
rates on labor, proﬁts and capital gains, tL, tΠ, tV on n∗ are ambiguous.
Proof. Diﬀerentiate (24) and (28).
The reason why increases in taxes on wages and/or consumption generate
a decrease of the growth rate is of course that those taxes have no direct eﬀect
on growth, while their indirect eﬀect is to decrease the dividend income tax
which reallocates resources from quality growth to variety expansion. More
intriguing is the reason why increases in taxes on proﬁts and capital gains,
which have ambiguous direct eﬀects on growth and the number of ﬁrms, now
unambiguously reduce growth and raise the number of ﬁrms. The key is the
diﬀerent steady-state locus that applies in this exercise, equation (27) above,
that shows how increases in tΠ or tV are oﬀset in the government’s budget
constraint by reductions in tD, which reduce growth. Similarly, growth
is increasing in σ, which is a subsidy to incumbents’ R&D, because the
expenditure is ﬁnanced with an increase of the dividend income tax which
reinforces the pro growth eﬀect of the subsidy. This property has surprising
welfare implications, to which I now turn.
To ﬁx a benchmark for comparison, let a star denote steady-state values
of the endogenous variables for an arbitrary initial vector σ, tL, tC, tΠ, tV ,
23and let a double star denote values produced by the posited change in ﬁscal
policy.
Proposition 3 A revenue-neutral introduction of full expensibility of cor-
porate ﬁrms’ R&D (σ =1 ) ﬁnanced with an increase of the dividend income
tax is welfare improving. A revenue-neutral elimination of taxation of cor-
porate proﬁts and of capital gains on corporate equity holdings (tΠ = tV =0 )
ﬁnanced with an increase of the dividend income tax is welfare improving.
Proof. These policies belong to category (a) discussed in the previous
section. They leave T unchanged and they eliminate distortions of the pro-
duction/investment choices of ﬁrms so that Ψ = 1. When the change of
tax structure takes place, c and l remain at c∗ and l∗. Given the initial
condition n∗, transition dynamics feature a gradual decline toward n∗∗.T h e
growth rate z jumps up and then rises gradually toward z∗∗. This change in
tax structure improves welfare because it has no level eﬀects while it raises
growth permanently. Formally, for a policy implemented at time t =0t h e


















The second line of this expression makes clear that the policy improves
welfare because it raises the rate of return to innovation.
Proposition 4 A revenue-neutral reduction of the tax rates on labor income
and/or consumption ﬁnanced with an increase in the dividend income tax is
welfare improving.
Proof. These policies belong to category (b) discussed above. They
raise T and the scale factor Ωl. When the government reduces tL and/or
tC, the consumption and employment ratios jump to c∗∗ >c ∗ and l∗∗ >l ∗,
respectively, since the policy reduces the distortions of the households’ con-
sumption/leisure and labor/leisure decisions. Accordingly, the downward
24sloping growth locus (20) in Figure 2 shifts up as ﬁrms respond to the larger
market size by pursuing quality improvements more aggressively (this tran-
sitory scale eﬀect is characteristic of models of this class). The economy
then experiences an initial jump up in the growth rate z followed by either
a decrease or an increase. The reason is that the eﬀect of the change in
tax structure on the number of ﬁrms per capita is ambiguous due to two
competing eﬀects. First, the dividend income tax discriminates against en-
trants in favor of incumbents. This is the well known argument mentioned
above that an increase in taxation of distributed earnings provides an in-
centive to retain earnings and reinvest them in the growth of the ﬁrm. In
general equilibrium, this comes at the expense of funding opportunities for
new varieties. Second, the larger market created by these policies attracts
entry. This eﬀect is regulated by the response of labor supply to tax rates.
If the net eﬀect is to raise the number of ﬁrms per capita, the growth rate of
quality overshoots the steady-state level and converges to its long-run level
from above. In the opposite case, it converges from below. In both cases the
economy experiences a permanent acceleration of the growth rate of quality.
This policy improves welfare because it increases the consumption and em-




u∗ =l o g
l∗∗
l∗ +l o g
c∗∗
c∗ + γ log
1 − l∗∗
1 − l∗ +
Z t
0
[z (s) − z∗]ds.
As in the case above, integration yields the change in welfare.
Propositions 3-4 suggest that the posited policies are desirable since they
increase welfare. A natural question is: Are they feasible, that is, do they
satisfy the constraint 0 <t D < 1? Recall that solving for tD requires
solving equation (25) above. Recall that the right-hand side of the equation
deﬁnes the dividend tax revenue curve. This curve has a positive intercept
at tD =0 . T h u s ,i fT is suﬃciently low and/or tΠ and tV are suﬃciently
high it is possible to obtain a solution tD ≤ 0. This uninteresting case can
be ruled out by a suitable choice of the initial vector σ, tL, tC, tΠ, tV .I ti s
more interesting to check whether tD ≥ 1 can occur. To simplify matters,
observe that tD is highest when tV = tΠ = 0, in which case the budget
constraint yields T = tDπ (z)s ot h a ttD < 1r e q u i r e sT<π(z). If a policy
is feasible in this case, it is surely feasible in the case tV ,t Π > 0
Consider now a policy that raises T to T + ∆T and sets tV = tΠ =0 .
Transition dynamics in response to this policy exhibit an initial jump up
in π due to the elimination of tΠ and tV , see equation (18), and an initial
25jump up in z due to the shift up of the growth equation (20). Two cases are
possible. If n∗∗ >n ∗, z overshoots the new steady state level and converges
to z∗∗ from above. Accordingly, π is lowest, so that tD is highest, at the end
of the transition. The feasibility condition then is
T + ∆T<π∗∗ = ρβθ2 + T + ∆T,
which is obviously satisﬁed. Things are harder when n∗∗ <n ∗,b e c a u s ez
undershoots so that π is lowest, and tD is highest, at the beginning of the
transition. Taking into account that π jumps initially so that π(z) > π∗,
the feasibility condition is
T + ∆T<π∗ = ρβθ2 + T<π (z).
Therefore, one needs to check that the parametric restriction ∆T<ρβθ2 is
satisﬁed. This is obviously true if ∆T = 0 as in Proposition 3.
The conclusion of this analysis is that the policy in Proposition 3 is
surely feasible, while a suﬃcient condition for feasibility of the policy in
Proposition 4 is n∗∗ >n ∗,t h a ti s ,
l∗∗
l∗ >
θ(1 − θ)(1− α) − T − ρβθ2
θ(1 − θ)[1− αΨ] − T − ∆T − ρβθ2.
On the right-hand side of this inequality is the relative increase in the tax
pressure on the ﬁrms’ cash ﬂow, which requires the proﬁtr a t i oπ to rise, so
to expand the tax base, and thus requires the number of ﬁrms per capita to
fall. (Recall that dynamics are driven by the fact that in equilibrium π is
decreasing in n through the market share eﬀect.) On the left-hand side of
the inequality is the relative increase in market size that allows the proﬁt
ratio π to rise even if n rises. The inequality, therefore, says that the number
of ﬁrms per capita rises if the market size eﬀect dominates.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I have investigated the role of taxation in a very tractable
Schumpeterian growth model that assigns a central role to the corporation
viewed as a long-lived proﬁt center that brings a continuous ﬂow of innova-
tions to the market. These features make the model very useful for thinking
about distortionary taxes, in particular taxes on corporate activity.
The prediction that the dividend income tax raises growth and welfare
is perhaps surprising. On close inspection, however, it rests on a straightfor-
ward intuition. The dividend income tax discriminates between incumbents
26and entrants because it does not distort the internal production/investment
choice of the ﬁrm (due to expensibility of R&D) while it creates a wedge
between the pre- and after-tax returns to equity holding. Speciﬁcally, the
tax provides an incentive to retain earnings and invest them in the growth
of the ﬁrm rather than distributing them to stockholders, who can then use
them to purchase shares issued by entrepreneurs who create new ﬁrms. This
feature is a direct consequence of the fact that while the corporation that
consistently dominates its product line is the model’s main agent of long-run
technological change, the transitional dynamics are driven by entry of new
ﬁrms. The model thus features both an intensive (quality) and an exten-
sive (variety) margin of technological advance. The interaction of these two
margins produces the novel and surprising result concerning the dividend
income tax.
This mechanism has further interesting implications for the role of other
distortionary taxes — on labor, consumption, or corporate proﬁts — and for
revenue-neutral changes in ﬁscal policy. For example, I showed that reduc-
tion of taxes on labor, consumption and/or (pre-distribution) corporate prof-
its ﬁnanced with increases in the tax rate on dividend income (distributed
proﬁts) raise growth and welfare.
This analysis is particularly relevant to the current debate. One argu-
ment in support of the Job Growth and Taxpayer Relief reconciliation Act
of 2003 (JGTRRA) that is based on conventional economic wisdom is that
the substantial reduction of tax rates on distributed dividends will reduce
the corporate cost of capital and thereby increase investment. This paper’s
analysis suggests that things are not so straightforward in an environment
where market structure matters. The growth and welfare eﬀects of such
interventions depend crucially on how they aﬀect decisions on the produc-
tion/investment margin internal to the ﬁr ma n do nh o wt h a ya ﬀect the
ﬁnancial market’s allocation of funds between incumbents and entrants. It
is the latter, extensive margin that produces the novel results of this paper.
Taking this margin seriously requires us to rethink some of the conventional
wisdom underlying basic propositions concerning the role of corporations
and of corporate taxation in the macroeconomy.
6A p p e n d i x
6.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Holding constant c, ﬂow utility is increasing in l if l< 1
1+γ. Observing that
the largest possible value of the employment ratio obtains for tL = tC =0 ,












(ρ − λ)βθ2 +1− θ > 0.
This inequality holds because ρ > λ is necessary to have bounded utility.
It follows that the steady states occur on the upward sloping portion of the
ﬂow utility function with respect to the employment rate.
6.2 General CIES preferences
Suppose that ﬂow utility takes the form




, ξ > 0
As is well known, the case analyzed in the text obtains for ξ =1 .T h eE u l e r
equation for consumption now reads
r = ξ ˆ C + ρ
=( ξ − 1) ˆ C + ˆ C + ρ.
Substituting into the household’s budget constraint as I did in the text yields
0=( ξ − 1) ˆ C +
³
ˆ C + λ − ˆ Y
´
+ ρ − λ +





(r − ρ)+ˆ c + ρ − λ +
(1 − tL)(1− θ) − (1 + tC)c
βθ2 .
Now recall that equation (17) characterizes r as a function of n and l,w h i c h
is a function of c. These facts allow me to write
ˆ c = −
ξ − 1
ξ
[r(n,c) − ρ] − (ρ − λ) −

















As one can see, the consumption ratio is not constant at all times because
the substitution and income eﬀects of changes in the interest rate do not
cancel out. Nevertheless, one can study dynamics in (n,c)s p a c ei nt h e
conventional manner. Equation (26) used in the text still applies with the
diﬀerence that because c is not constant, I need to write it as




θ(1 − θ)[1− αΨ] −
(φ−ρ)n
Ωl(c) n<¯ n
θ(1 − θ) −
φn
Ωl(c) n ≥ ¯ n
,




This system produces the same qualitative results as the case discussed in
the text, in particular Propositions 3-4. The analysis, however, is more
complicated.
6.3 Symmetric treatment of incumbents and entrants
One might think that the results above are driven by the assumption that
the R&D expenditures of incumbents are expensible while the setup costs
of entrants are not. The reason is that this assumption builds into the
analysis a distortion in favor of R&D by incumbents due to the corporate
income tax since it implies a subsidy to quality growth that does not apply
to variety expansion. To show that this is not the case, I now assume the
R&D expenditures of incumbents and the setup costs of entrants receive
symmetric treatment.
Speciﬁcally, suppose that entry costs are subsidized at rate σtΠ so that
in symmetric equilibrium the value of the ﬁrm is V = βX (1 − σtΠ).15 The
expression for the rate of return to equity is then
r =( 1− tD)
·
1 − tΠ
βθ2 (1 − σtΠ)
π −
(1 − σ)tΠ




+( 1− tV ) ˆ X.
15Observe that if σ = 1, symmetric treatment of incumbents and entrants implies that
the corporate income tax generates zero revenue — a fairly inplausible and uninteresting
case.
















As one can see, as long as σ < 1t h e r ei sa ne ﬀect of the corporate income
tax. The reason is that the eﬀective tax rate diﬀe r sa c r o s si n c u m b e n t sa n d
entrants even if the nominal rate is the same.
The government’s budget constraint reads
T =[ tΠ + tD (1 − tΠ)]π + tΠ (1 − tD)(1− σ)
NR
Y
+ tV βθ2 ˆ X − σtΠβθ2 ˆ N,
where the last term is the subsidy to entrants. Equations (17)-(18) apply
unchanged, while equation (26) now reads
βθ2 [ˆ n(1 + σtΠtV )+ρ − (ρ − λ + tV z)σtΠ]=π − T.
Observing that r and π are decreasing functions of n, this expression again
deﬁnes a dynamical system in (n, ˆ n) space that is stable.
The steady state solution for growth can now be described in (z,π)s p a c e
as the intersection of the proﬁt locus (18) with the modiﬁed equity locus
π = T + βθ2 [ρ − σtΠ (ρ − λ + tV z)].
As one can see, this locus is decreasing in z and everywhere below the
one that applies in the previous analysis so that one concludes that with
symmetric treatment of incumbents and entrants the steady state growth
rate and proﬁt ratio are lower. This is intuitive since, with respect to the
previous case, this analysis introduces in a revenue-neutral fashion a subsidy
to entry. Not surprisingly, therefore, I also ﬁnd that the number of ﬁrms per
capita is now higher. Aside from these diﬀerences, however, Propositions
3-4 apply qualitatively unchanged.
A ﬁnal observation puts this discussion in perspective. The only rea-
son why partial expensibility of corporate R&D yields a distortion of the
production/investment/entry choice is because there is a corporate income
tax to begin with. If tΠ = 0 partial expensibility becomes irrelevant. As
discussed above, repealing the corporate income tax improves welfare if the
revenue shortfall is covered by an increase of the dividend income tax. It
follows that the corporate income tax should be set at zero thereby making
σ irrelevant.
306.4 Positive social returns to variety
One might think that the results obtained above depend on the assumption
of zero social returns to variety. I now show that this is not so. Rewrite the
reduced-form production function in (13) as
y = nηΩlZ, 0 ≤ η < 1 (29)
so that output per capita depends positively on the number of ﬁrms per
capita.16 These social increasing returns to variety are external to all agents
so that their behavior does not change with respect to the characterization
above. The only important diﬀerence is that the instantaneous reservation
interest rate of savers now is
r = ρ + z + ηˆ n,
where the last term captures the contribution of product variety growth to
total factor productivity growth. The presence of this term complicates the
algebra without altering the basic results.
Equations (17) and (18) modiﬁed appropriately now yield (for simplicity
I focus only on equilibria with positive z)
π =
·







(ρ + ηˆ n),
while equation (19) remains unchanged. As one can see, these expressions
yield a diﬀerential equation where the term ˆ n enters non-linearly. This
complicates the analysis of global dynamics considerably. The local analy-
sis, however, yields qualitative results similar to those discussed in Section
3. To see this, consider that in steady state ˆ n = 0 so that the equations
characterizing equilibrium of the asset market remain the same. The only

















1−θ di, 0 < θ < 1, ν > 0.
Proceeding as in the body of the paper, this expression yields equation (29) above with
η =
ν
1−θ. See Aghion and Howitt (1998, pp. 407-408, in particular footnote 6) for
arguments that justify introducing social returns to variety in this fashion.
31It is important to notice that the values l∗ and z∗ that enter this expression
are exactly those that apply in the case η = 0. Thus, social increasing
returns to variety simply deliver a higher number of ﬁrms per capita without
changing any other feature of the steady state. Linearization around the
steady state then allows me to show that the local behavior of the dynamical
system is similar to that characterized in Section 3.
Things are simpler if one wants to replicate the analysis of Section 4.
The reason is that the equation characterizing the return to equity is (26),
instead of (19), where T is a constant. Substituting the expression above
for the proﬁt ratio into (26) yields
ˆ n =
θ(1 − θ)[1− αΨ] −
(φ−ρ)n1−η





As long as η < 1, this diﬀerential equation has the same properties as the










The restriction η < 1 implies that positive social returns to variety do not
overturn the market share eﬀect. This ensures that the basic forces at work
in the model, and therefore the characterization of the equilibrium dynamics
of the decentralized market, remain qualitatively unchanged.
To check that the welfare implications remain the same as well, consider
the change in welfare delivered by the policy discussed in Proposition 3.
(The argument for Proposition 4 is essentially the same.) With positive
social returns to variety, this policy triggers a quality/variety trade-oﬀ that
















[z (s) − z∗]ds.
The growth/variety trade-oﬀ is now explicit since n is traveling towards













[z (s) − z∗]ds.
















r(s) − r∗ = αθ(1 − θ)
Ωl∗
n(s)
1−η − Ψαθ(1 − θ)
Ωl∗
n∗1−η









since n(s) <n ∗ and Ψ < 1. It is then clear that the policy delivers an
increase in welfare because it raises the return to innovation, exactly as in
t h ec a s ed i s c u s s e da b o v eo fη =0 .
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Figure 3: Equilibrium with endogenous dividend tax rate 